Theory and Prosecution Evidence by Jianping Mei et al.
  0
 
 
Behavior Based Manipulation:   
Theory and Prosecution Evidence
* 
 
Jianping Mei 
New York University 
Guojun Wu 
University of Michigan 
Chunsheng Zhou 
Peking University 
 
This Version: April 7, 2004 
 
                                                        
* We are grateful to helpful discussions with Franklin Allen and Wei Xiong. Mei is from Department of 
Finance, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126; 
(212) 998-0354; jmei@stern.nyu.edu. Wu is from School of Business, University of Michigan, 701 
Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; Phone: (734) 936-3248; Fax: (734) 936-0274; Email: 
gjwu@umich.edu. Zhou is from Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, 
China; Email: zhoucs@gsm.pku.edu.cn. We also thank Bin Liu, Jiaqi Tang and Xuewu Wang for able 
research assistance. Zhou acknowledges generous financial support from the National Science Foundation 
of China (grant # 70325001/G0206).   1
 
 
Behavior Based Manipulation:   
Theory and Prosecution Evidence 
 
 
Abstract 
If investors are not fully rational, what can smart money do? This paper provides an example 
in which smart money can strategically take advantage of investors’ behavioral biases and 
manipulate the price process to make profit. The paper considers three types of traders, 
behavior-driven investors who are less willing to sell losers than to sell winners (dispositional 
effect), arbitrageurs, and a manipulator who can influence asset prices. We show that, due to the 
investors’ behavioral biases and the limit of arbitrage, the manipulator can profit from a 
“pump-and-dump” trading strategy by accumulating the speculative asset while pushing the asset 
price up, and then selling the asset at high prices. Since nobody has private information, 
manipulation here is completely trade-based. The paper also endogenously derives several 
asset-pricing anomalies, including excess volatility, momentum and reversal. As an empirical test, 
the paper presents some empirical evidence from the U.S. SEC prosecution of “pump-and-dump” 
manipulation cases that are consistent with our model. 
 
JEL: G12, G18 
Keywords: manipulation, behavioral finance, loss aversion  2
Behavioral studies in economics and finance, such as Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2000), 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), suggest that economic 
agents are less than fully rational
1. They are often psychologically biased. Their psychological 
biases, together with “limits of arbitrage”, lead to asset prices deviating from fundamental values 
and may generate a large number of anomalies that cannot be easily explained in the rational 
expectations paradigm. 
While it is important to identify plausible causes for asset pricing anomalies, some investors 
would be more interested in knowing how to take advantage of other people’s behavioral biases 
to make money. In this paper, we build an equilibrium model to demonstrate how “smart money” 
can profit from other investors’ irrational behaviors. The model has three classes of investors: 
behavior-driven investors, arbitrageurs, and a manipulator. Among various behavioral biases of 
behavior-driven investors, the reluctance to sell losers (dispositional effect) plays an important 
role in our model. Arbitrageurs play a critical role in preventing large price jumps and market 
crashes, but because of the limits of arbitrage, they cannot fully eliminate asset price’s deviation 
from fundamental value. The manipulator is a large investor who is a price setter rather than a 
price taker. As a deep-pocket investor, he pumps up the stock price with a series of buying orders 
and then dumps the stock to make a profit by taking advantage of the disposition effect and the 
limits of arbitrage. 
Numerous empirical studies suggest that there exist trading strategies that can yield positive 
abnormal returns presumably because of asset pricing errors. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) report that investors can make substantial abnormal profits by buying past winners and 
selling past losers
2. These studies have several common characteristics. First, they are based on 
observed or realized prices. Naturally, the realized prices are the result of interactions among a 
large number of investors. Therefore, it is difficult to identify the roles played by different 
                                                        
1  Barberis and Thaler (2003), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) and Hirshleifer (2001) provide detailed 
surveys of the behavior literature. 
2Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2003) argue that the profit of the momentum strategy documented by 
Jegadeesh and Titman is illusory because of transactions costs. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou’s result 
therefore provides positive evidence for the argument of “limits of arbitrage.”   3
investors in price determination. Second, the trading strategies such as the momentum trading 
documented in the empirical literature usually takes the price process as exogenous. Investors 
cannot actively affect price processes for profit-making purpose.   
A distinctive feature of our model is its explicit investigation of how smart money (the 
manipulator) interacts with irrational traders and makes profit by exploiting their behavioral 
biases. In other words, the manipulator in our model manipulates the price process to create more 
chances for the irrational investors to make mistakes. This is an important feature, but largely 
assumed away in the existing behavioral finance literature.   
Moreover, the price movement in our model is completely trade based. It neither resorts to 
information asymmetry nor depends on the fundamental risk of the asset. Almost all other 
behavior-based asset pricing theories, however, depend on fundamental-related information or 
news in some ways. Here lies the main distinction of our model from De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990, DSSW thereafter).   
Finally, our model produces similar correlations among prices, turnover, and volatility to the 
model of investor overconfidence by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). In our model, the 
manipulator’s strategic action, together with other investors’ behavioral biases, not only brings 
the manipulator himself profit, but also brings about higher volatility, larger trading volume, 
short-term price continuation, and long-term price reversal. These results help us to further 
understand why investors trade and why asset prices sometimes fluctuate continually without any 
significant news on earnings or other fundamental variables. It provides a purely trade-based 
explanation on some well known empirical anomalies, such as price momentum and reversal. 
As an empirical test of our model, we hand collect data on “pump-and-dump” cases 
prosecuted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from January 1980 to December 
2002.    We find the “pump-and-dump” operations have led to higher return, increased volatility, 
larger trading volume, short-term price continuation and also long-term price reversal during the 
manipulation period. Moreover, small stocks are found to be more subject to the effects of 
manipulation. Therefore, the results from the SEC manipulation cases are consistent with our   4
model. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature of 
manipulation. Section 2 sets up the theoretical model. Section 3 solves the model for the  
“pump-and-dump” strategy and then extends the model to include the “dump and cover” strategy. 
Section 4 investigates the implications of the model on several well-known asset-pricing 
anomalies. Section 5 provides some empirical evidence from the SEC prosecution of 
“pump-and-dump” manipulation cases. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1.  A Review of the Manipulation Literature 
Market manipulation is an issue that is almost as old as the earliest stock market. Even 
though market manipulation might be much more severe in the early years of financial markets, 
it is too early to say that manipulation is no longer of importance. In modern financial markets, 
manipulations are often taken in hidden ways that cannot be easily detected and outlawed. In 
many emerging markets where market regulations are weak, manipulation is still rampant.
3 Even 
in the relatively well- regulated US market, Aggarwal and Wu (2003) have documented hundreds 
of cases of price manipulation in the 1990s.   
Following Allen and Gale (1992), we classify manipulation into three categories: 
information-based manipulation, action-based manipulation, and trade-based manipulation.   
Information-based manipulation is carried out by releasing false information or spreading 
misleading rumors. The operation of “trading pools” in the United States during the 1920s gives 
examples of information-based manipulation. A group of investors would combine to form a pool: 
first to buy a stock, then to spread favorable rumors about the firm, and finally to sell out at a 
profit. The striking cases of Enron and Worldcom in 2001 might also be related to 
information-based manipulation. Van Bommel (2003) shows the role of rumors in facilitating 
price manipulation. Benabou and Laroque (1992) show that if an opportunistic individual has 
                                                        
3  For example, China's worst stock-market crime in 2002 was a scheme by seven people, including two 
former China Venture Capital executives, accused of using $700 million and 1,500 brokerage accounts 
nationwide to manipulate the company share price.     5
privileged information and his statements are to certain extent viewed as credible by investors, 
he can profitably manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements. As 
privileged information is noisy and learning remains incomplete, opportunistic individuals 
(corporate officers, financial journalists, or “gurus”) can manipulate the market repeatedly, even 
though their manipulation power is limited in the long run by public’s constant reassessment of 
their credibility. In a related article, John and Narayanan (1997) discuss market manipulation 
through inside information and the role of insider trading regulations. They show that the 
existing disclosure rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) creates incentives for 
an informed insider to manipulate the stock market by sometimes trading in the wrong direction 
(i.e., buying with bad news and selling with good news about the firm). By doing so, the insider 
can effectively reduce the informativeness of his subsequent trade disclosure because the market 
is not sure whether an insider’s buying (selling) indicates good (bad) news. Consequently, the 
insider maintains his information superiority for a longer period of time.
4   
Action-based manipulation is based on actions (other than trading) that change the actual or 
perceived value of the assets. Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) investigate action-based manipulation 
using take-over bids. In their model, a manipulator acquires stock in a firm and then announces a 
take-over bid. This leads to a price run up of the firm’s stock. The manipulator therefore is able 
to sell his stock at the higher price. Of course, the bid is dropped eventually.   
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established extensive provisions aimed at eliminating 
manipulation. By regulating information disclosure and restricting and monitoring the trading 
activities of the directors, managers, and insiders, the Act has successfully made market 
manipulation more difficult. The types of manipulation that the Act effectively outlawed are 
mainly information-based and action-based. As a matter of fact, regulating information 
disclosure of public companies has now become one of the most important tasks of virtually all 
regulatory bodies around the world.   
Trade-based manipulation, however, is much more difficult to eradicate. It occurs when a 
                                                        
4  In addition, Vila (1989) presents an example of information-based manipulation where the manipulator 
shorts the stock, releases false information and then buys back the stock at a lower price.   6
large trader or a group of traders attempt to manipulate the price of an asset simply by buying 
and then selling, without releasing false information or taking any publicly observable action to 
alter the asset value. This type of manipulation could be of great importance empirically. Hedge 
funds often buy and then sell large blocks of stock, even though they are apparently not 
interested in taking over the firm. In our opinion, these large buying/selling activities could be 
taken sometimes for the purpose of trade-based manipulation.   
Allen and Gale (1992) build a model showing that trade-based manipulation is possible in a 
rational expectations framework. The Allen and Gale model has three trading dates (indexed by 
3 2 1 ， ， = t ) and three types of traders, a continuum of identical rational investors, a large informed 
trader who enters the market at date 1 if and only if he has private information, and a large 
manipulator who observes whether the informed trader has the private information. The 
manipulator has a small but positive probability to enter the market and to mimic the informed 
trader’s action when the informed trader actually has no private information. The manipulator is 
able to achieve a positive profit under certain conditions because there can exist a pooling 
equilibrium in which the investors are uncertain whether a large trader who buys shares is a 
manipulator or an informed trader.   
Aggarwal and Wu (2003) present a theory and some empirical evidence on stock price 
manipulation in the United States. Extending the framework of Allen and Gale (1992), they 
consider what happens when a manipulator can trade in the presence of other rational traders 
who seek out information about the stock’s true value. In a market with manipulators, they show 
more information seekers imply a greater competition for shares, making it easier for a 
manipulator to enter the market and potentially worsening market efficiency. 
Using a unique daily trade level data set from the main stock market in Pakistan, Khwaja and 
Mian (2003) distinguish between trades done by brokers on their own behalf and those done as 
intermediaries for outside investors. They find that brokers earn at least 8% higher returns on 
their own trades. While neither market timing nor liquidity provision offer sufficient 
explanations for this result, they find compelling evidence for a specific trade-based   7
“pump-and-dump” price manipulation scheme.   
There are several other articles investigating manipulation.
5 Hart (1977) investigates the 
conditions of equilibrium price process under which manipulation is possible. He considers 
conditions under which profitable speculation is possible in an infinite horizon deterministic 
economy. He finds that manipulation is possible if the economy is dynamically unstable or if 
demand functions are non-linear and satisfy some technical conditions. Jarrow (1992) extends 
Hart’s analysis to a stochastic setting with time dependent price process. He shows that profitable 
manipulation is possible if the manipulator can corner the market. He also demonstrates the 
manipulator can achieve a positive profit if he is able to establish a price trend and trade against 
it. Merrick, Naik and Yadav (2003) examine a case of manipulation involving a delivery squeeze 
on a bond futures contract traded in London. Their analysis is unrelated to “pump-and-dump”, 
but they establish strong empirical support for the possibility of manipulating asset prices for 
profit. To conserve space, we are sorry to skip many other important articles in this literature. 
  Our investigation of manipulation is based on a different setup and generates several new 
insights. First, because our model does not rest on information asymmetry or fundamental risk, 
manipulation investigated here is therefore purely trade-based. This makes our study distinct 
from information-based model such as DSSW.
6 Second, our model does not depend on various 
market frictions discussed in the literature (e.g., Jarrow 1992), such as corners, short squeezes, 
etc.  Third, and most importantly, we derive the equilibrium price process endogenously by 
constructing manipulator’s trading strategies based on certain well-documented behavioral biases 
of investors. Theoretically, the large trader can manipulate the price process repeatedly and 
frequently as long as there are investors who have those behavioral biases specified in the model.   
The contributions of our work are multi-fold. First, the paper provides an application of 
behavioral theories documented in the literature to endogenously derive several well-known 
asset-pricing anomalies.  Second, we provide an additional example of trade-based 
                                                        
5  Camerer (1998) tests whether naturally occurring markets can be strategically manipulated using a field 
experiment with racetrack betting. Kumar and Seppi (1992) develop a model of manipulation in futures 
markets. 
6  See section 4 for a detailed comparison between our model and De Long et al. (DSSW, 1990).     8
manipulation, distinct from the model of Allen and Gale (1992)--that does not impose 
assumptions on information asymmetry or the probability of manipulation. Third, we 
demonstrate a possibility of trade-based manipulation based on realistic assumptions about 
behavior that have been well documented empirically. One may view our paper as a companion 
paper of Allen and Gale. They study the possibility of price manipulation under rational 
expectations with information asymmetry while we provide a case of market manipulation under 
behavioral bias and limits to arbitrage but with no fundamental risk or information asymmetry. 
 
2.  The Model Economy 
We consider a discrete-time market in which there exist a speculative asset and a riskfree 
bond. The riskfree bond yields a zero net return each period of time. There are three classes of 
investors, a manipulator, arbitrageurs, and behavior-driven traders, who buy and sell the 
speculative asset following their own rules. The characteristics of these investors are described in 
detail in the following assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1. We consider a discrete-time economy that begins at time  , 0 = t   and ends at time 
T t = (namely,  0,1,2,..., tT = ).  A continuum number of new behavior-driven investors, with 
measure 1, enter the market at the beginning of each period t. They are price-takers and each of 
them has a probability of  1 q  to buy a share of the speculative asset if the price of the asset at 
time t>0,  t P , is greater than the asset price at time t-1,  1 − t P.  I f   1 − ≤ t t P P , each new 
behavior-driven investor has a probability of  2 q   to buy a share of the speculative asset.   
At the beginning of the economy, t = 0, the price of the speculative asset ( 0 P ) is equal to the 
fundamental value of the asset, and the behavior-driven investors are endowed with  1 q  shares 
of the speculative asset in total. Those investors who own the speculative asset at the beginning   9
of the economy take  0 P   as the initial acquiring cost per share of the speculative asset. 
The new behavior-driven investors at time t>0 who do not buy the speculative asset choose 
to leave the market right away. The old generations of behavior-driven investors who entered the 
market before t>0 do not buy any more shares at time t. Behavior-driven investors like to take 
quick profits. They sell their shares as soon as they have made a profit and then leave the market. 
Consider a behavior-driven investor who buys a share of the speculative asset at time t and has 
not sold his share by the beginning of time  ) 0 ( > + k k t . If  k t t P P + < , he shall liquidate his 
share in the period of  k t +  for sure; if  k t t P P + ≥ , he will have a probability of  1 3 < q t o  
liquidate his share in the period of  k t + . Behavior-driven investors leave the market right after 
they have liquidated their shares. 
 The  assumption  1 3 < q   plays a critical role in our model, which is made on the basis of the 
dispositional effect as explained below. Empirical studies suggest that investors often follow a 
momentum trading (positive feedback trading) strategy that implies  1 2 q q < . Although the 
momentum feature is of importance empirically and will be discussed throughout the article, we 
do not need  1 2 q q <  to generate “pump-and-dump” manipulation in our model. As a matter of 
fact, the momentum feature indicates that the behavior-driven investors buy fewer shares in a 
down market, which makes “pump-and-dump” manipulation more difficult. However, as long as 
the dispositional effect dominates, the manipulator can successfully profit from 
“pump-and-dump” strategy. 
Dispositional effect is a well-documented empirical phenomenon. According to Shefrin and 
Statman (1985), Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Han (2001), etc., investors, especially the 
individual ones, are more likely to sell stocks that have gone up in value relative to their 
purchase price, rather than stocks that have gone down. Two behavioral explanations for the 
dispositional effect have been suggested in the literature. The first explanation suggests that 
investors may have a biased belief in mean-reversion. The second explanation relies on prospect   10
theory and narrow framing.   
The momentum phenomenon found by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) has been well analyzed 
in the behavioral finance literature. In the Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, BSV henceforth) 
model, momentum can occur because of the investors’ conservatism. Hong and Stein (1999) 
explicitly add momentum traders—traders buying stocks after a price increase—to their model. 
Many other researchers, including DSSW and Cutler, Summers, and Poterba (1990), have also 
investigated momentum trading or positive feedback trading. The simplest way of motivating 
positive feedback trading is extrapolative expectations. Namely, as investors form expectations 
by extrapolating trends, they buy into price trends. This can be due to some important 
psychological biases of investors, including representativeness and the law of small numbers 
(Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
Robert J. Shiller (2002, p14) has the following vivid description on momentum trading or 
feedback trading: 
When speculative prices go up, creating successes of some investors, this may attract public 
attention, promote word-of-mouth enthusiasm, and heighten expectations for further price 
increases. … This process in turn increases investor demand, and thus generates another round 
of price increases. … The high prices are ultimately not sustainable, since they are high only 
because of expectations of further price increases. … 
  We will demonstrate that we are able to generate price momentum in our model even 
without momentum traders. It is worth noting, although momentum trading/positive trading is 
not needed to obtain our major results, to make our model more realistic and more flexible, we 
do not rule out the possibility of momentum trading in the following analyses. 
 
Assumption 2. There is a manipulator in the market who is a large market player and is able to 
influence the asset price. In other words, the manipulator is a price-setter rather than a 
price-taker. He enters the market at time 1 without any initial endowment of the speculative asset. 
At each period of time  1 ≥ t , the manipulator sets a price target for that period and then submits   11
his order to clear the market at the target price.   
The assumption that the manipulator is a large trader is conventional in the literature on 
trade-based manipulation. In order to move the market with strategic trading, the manipulator 
must have the power to influence the price (see Jarrow (1992) and Allen and Gale (1992)). In 
Table 1, we provide many historical cases where many investors, such as wealthy individuals or 
a group of investors (e.g., Vanderbilt during the Harlem Railroad corner (see Allen and Gale 
(1992)), large hedge funds, and trading pools in the US history) can be classified as large traders. 
These traders often not only have deep pockets, but also are influential in the securities markets. 
 
Assumption 3. There is also a continuum number of arbitrageurs, with measure 1, enters the 
market at time t=1. They are price-takers and trade shares of the speculative asset based on 
recent price movements. If the price moves up in the current period, they sell some shares to take 
profits. If the price goes down, they buy. Formally, they submit the following orders at time t: 
() ( ) t t t t a P P P D ∆ − = − − = − α α 1 ,       ( 1 )  
where α>0.  
Although the new trades of the arbitrageurs in each period only depend on short term price 
movements, the total position of the speculative asset held by the arbitrageurs,  t Q , is negatively 
proportional to price deviation from fundamentals. This is because the arbitrageurs have already 
held a portfolio of  () () 0 1
1
1
1 1 P P P P Q t
t
j
j j t − − = − − = −
−
=
− − ∑ α α   shares of the speculative asset at time 
1 − t , if they buy additional  () 1 − − − t t P P α   shares at time  t, the total position of the speculative 
asset held by them will be  ( ) 0 P P Q t t − − = α  shares. The arbitrageurs play two roles in our 
model.  First, they provide necessary liquidity to the market so that trading can take place at 
equilibrium for each period. For instance, if the manipulator wants to move the asset price up by 
submitting a purchasing order, there must be some investors selling sufficient number of shares 
of the speculative asset. Because the behavior-driven investors in a sense are momentum   12
followers, a new class of investors is therefore needed in the model. Second, our model rules out 
fundamental risk. The arbitrageurs’ trading strategy ensures that the price of speculative asset 
will not move away from fundamentals explosively. We call α the arbitrage parameter and will 
discuss its meaning and implication further in the next section. 
 
Assumption 4. Although the manipulator enters the market at time 1, the market already existed 
at time 0. The price of the speculative asset at time 0 was  0 P , which was equal to the 
fundamental value of the asset. There were  1 q  behavior-driven  investors  who held one share of 
the speculative asset per person at the market close of day 0. 
The manipulator tends to move the asset price up by a fixed amount of  0 > δ  for  u t 
( 1 > u t ) consecutive periods from day 1 to day  u t . That is 
1 0, 1,2,..., . tt u PP t t δ − −= > =        ( 2 )  
By the close of day  u t , the manipulator has accumulated certain number of shares of the 
speculative asset. He starts liquidating his shares from day  u t +1 and keeps doing so until he has 
sold all of his shares by time T-1 for some  1 + > u t T . We define  u d t T t − − = 1   as the length of 
time the manipulator takes to liquidate his shares accumulated by time  u t.  
In order to ensure market equilibrium for each day, δ shall satisfy certain condition as 
discussed subsequently. Assumption 4 is not the only possible assumption that can make 
manipulation profitable, but is a simple one.   
 
Assumption 5. The manipulator leaves the market right after he has sold all his shares at T-1. 
The market ends at time T and by then investors receive a liquidating dividend of  0 P  for each 
share of the speculative asset.   
Assumption 5 is not really needed for discussing the manipulation issue in the model. We   13
make this assumption here following the convention in the literature and the widespread belief 
that in the long run, fundamental rules. The assumption is useful in discussing certain asset price 
anomalies such as long-term reversal. It is easy to see from assumptions 3 and 5 that the net 
purchases of arbitrageurs are zero over the whole time periods.   
Here, we assume the speculative asset has no fundamental risk. We also assume that there is 
no heterogeneous information. This does not mean that fundamental risks and information 
asymmetry are not important in the real market or in market manipulation. Rather, we use this 
simplified setup to highlight the manipulator’s trading strategies when the market is not fully 
rational. With this simple framework, we demonstrate that manipulation is possible even if there 
is no information asymmetry on asset fundamentals.   
 
3.  Results and Interpretations 
To solve the model, we first find out the accumulated holding of the speculative asset by the 
manipulator at the market close by time  u t.  We have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: By the market close at day  u t , the manipulator has accumulated  δ α ⋅ ⋅ = u t N 
shares of the speculative asset with an average cost of  δ 




 +
+
2
1
0
u t
P  per  share. 
Proof: By Assumptions 1 to 3, it follows immediately that for each period t, such as  u t t ≤ ≤ 1,  
the manipulator shall buy  δ α ⋅   shares at a price of  δ t P + 0 .  A simple calculation yields the 
statement in Proposition 1. ■ 
Proposition 1 highlights the important impact of arbitrage on the manipulator’s trading 
strategy. To move the price of the speculative asset by an amount of  δ , the manipulator must 
purchase  δ α ⋅   shares of the asset. If  α   is sufficiently large, the manipulator must have a very 
deep pocket to move the market. Put another way, when there is no limit of arbitrage, namely, 
∞ → α , it is almost impossible for the manipulator to “pump-and-dump” the speculative asset.   14
Therefore, the assumption of the “limits of arbitrage” is essential for the manipulator’s trading 
strategy to work. Proposition 1 also suggests that, the higher the original price of the asset, the 
more money the manipulator needs to put up for purchasing the shares. This implies, ceteris 
paribus, small cap stocks are more likely to be subject to price manipulation. 
We first consider a simple but interesting case in which behavior-driven investors are 
extremely unwilling to take losses, namely,  0 3 = q . This is a strong implication of the 
dispositional effect that has been supported by several empirical studies, such as Odean (1998) 
and Grinblatt and Han (2001) 
 
Proposition 2: If  0 3 = q , then the manipulator can sell his shares at a high price  δ u t P P + = 0 3  
from time  1 + = u t t  through  time  1 − =T t   by appropriately choosing a positive δ. By doing so, 
the manipulator’s total profit is 
2
2
1
2
1
δ α δ ⋅ 




 −
⋅ = 




 −
⋅ u
u u t
t t
N . The trading volume stays at 
1 q + αδ  shares per period from time  1 = t  to time  u t t = . From time  1 + = u t t  to time 
1 − =T t , trading volume per period is  2 q  shares--the manipulator sells  2 q  shares to new 
behavior-driven investors each period. 
Proof: Set 
α
δ
⋅
⋅
=
u
d
t
q t 2 . Because  0 3 = q , behavior-driven investors will not sell their shares 
without a profit. The manipulator is able to sell  2 q   shares to the new behavior-driven investors 
each period from day  1 + = u t t  through time  1 − =T t  by maintaining the equilibrium price at 
δ u t t P P
u + = 0 . The average selling price is 
u t P  per share. As a result, the manipulator’s total 
profit is 
2
0 2
1
2
1
δ α δ π ⋅ 




 −
⋅ = 










 +
+ − ⋅ = u
u u
t t
t t
P P N
u      (3)   15
Now, we consider trading volume. From time  1 = t  to time  u t t = , the price of speculative 
asset rises by δ  per time period. By assumptions, the old behavior-driven investors sell  1 q  
shares of the speculative asset while the new behavior-driven investors buy  1 q  shares in any 
period t, such as  u t t ≤ ≤ 1 . In the mean time, the arbitrageurs sell  αδ   shares each time period.   
In order to clear the market, the manipulator has to buy αδ  shares. The total trading volume 
from time  1 = t  to  time  u t t =  is  therefore  1 q + αδ   shares per period. 
Because the asset price remains constant from  time 1 + = u t t  to time  1 − =T t , the 
arbitrager will not trade in this case. The old behavior-driven investors who still own the shares 
at time  u t t >  should have bought at the peak price  δ u t t P P
u + = 0  and must not sell because 
they have not made any profits. On the other hand, the new behavior-driven investors choose to 
buy  2 q   shares at time u t t > . In order to clear the market, the manipulator has to sell  2 q  shares. 
The total trading volume in this case is  2 q  shares.■ 
Figure 1 presents the price dynamics, total trading volume and the buying/selling pattern of 
the manipulator based on Proposition 2. We use a positive number for the manipulator’s buying 
volume and a negative number for his selling volume. The steep rise in asset price and the 
purchase by the manipulator clearly demonstrates his “pumping” strategy, while the negative 
trading volume and a flat price shows the constant sell of his position to the behavioral investors. 
In the final period T=10, behavioral investors and arbitrageurs settle their shares at the price 
equal to fundamental value. The manipulator is out of the market, thus there is no trading 
volume. 
This proposition illustrates a special case in which the manipulator profits from the biases of 
behavior-driven investors who are not willing to sell losers. In contrast, behavior investors lose 
money on average. The behavior-driven investors who enter the market at early stage can make   16
profits but those who enter the market lately suffer severe losses
7. The arbitrageurs in this case 
can make a profit because they shorted shares at prices higher than  0 P  from  time  1 = t  to  time 
u t t =  and are able to cover their short positions at the fundamental value 0 P  at the end. 
However, if the arbitrageurs had to cover their short positions before T, they might suffer a loss. 
Because  1 2 q q < , the proposition indicates that the trading activities are more active in an up 
market than in a down market. This finding is consistent with the typical empirical observations. 
The proposition also indicates that both short-term momentum and long-term reversal 
phenomena can be generated in our behavior model even without fundamental shocks: The price 
of the speculative asset rises for several consecutive periods but moves down eventually.   
In general, when  0 3 > q , the situation will become more complicated. The following 
propositions illustrate several possible solutions to the model.   
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that  0 3 1 2 > ⋅ − ≡ q q q h . Then the manipulator can sell his shares at a 
high price  δ u t t P P
u + = 0  from  time  1 + = u t t  through  time  1 − = T t  by  appropriately 
choosing a positive  ( )
() 3
3 1 2
3 q t
q q q
q t
h
u u ⋅
⋅ − =
⋅ ⋅
< α α
δ . By doing so, the manipulator’s total 
profit is still 
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N . The trading volume remains at  1 q + αδ  
shares per period from time  1 = t  to time  u t t = . From time  1 + = u t t t o  t i m e   1 − =T t , 
trading volume per period is  2 q  shares and the manipulator is able to sell  () h q h
j
j
1
3 1
− − ≡  
shares at time j t t u + =  ( 1 ≥ j ). 
Proof: If the manipulator maintains the equilibrium price at  δ u t t P P
u + = 0  from  time  1 + = u t t  
                                                        
7  This explains why the behavior investors tend to follow the momentum and trade with the manipulator. Namely, even though 
they lose money on average, they have chances to make profits and they are just over-optimistic about these chancres. Moreover, 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002) claim that investors with behavior biases just trade too aggressively and often make blatant 
errors. If this were true, it would not be surprising that investors make money-losing trades with the manipulator.   17
through time  1 − =T t , the arbitrageurs will neither sell nor buy during these  u d t T t − − = 1  
periods according to Assumption 3. Assumption 1 indicates that, at time  1 + = u t t , the new 
behavior-driven investors will buy  2 q  shares in total, while the old behavior-driven investors 
will sell totally  3 1 q q ⋅  shares. Therefore at time  1 + = u t t , all behavior-driven investors will 
have a net purchase of  3 1 2 1 q q q h h ⋅ − ≡ =  shares. At time  2 + u t , the net purchase of the 
speculative asset by old and new behavior-driven investors will be 
()() h q q h q q h 3 3 1 2 2 1− = ⋅ + − ≡ . By the method of induction, we can prove that for any 
j t t u + = , such as  d t j ≤ < 0 , the net purchase of the speculative asset by all old and new 
behavior-driven investors will be 
( ) h q h
j
j
1
3 1
− − = , 
provided that the asset price is maintained at  δ u t t P P
u + = 0  from time  1 + = u t t  through time 
j t t u + = . 
Since the arbitrageurs will not trade when the asset price is stable, the manipulator must sell 
() h q h
j
j
1
3 1
− − =   shares at time  j t t u + =   to clear the market at a price of  .
u t P   As a result, the 
total number of shares he can sell at price 
u t P  from time  1 + = u t t  through time  1 − = T t  
equals  () } {
h
q
q
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d d t t
j
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− −
= ∑
= 3
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1 1
. If the manipulator chooses  ( ) [ ]
h
t
q q
u
td
⋅
− −
=
α
δ
3 3 1 1
, then he 
can sell all of his shares by time  1 − T . It follows immediately that if T goes to infinity, then 
3 q t
h
u ⋅
→
α
δ .   
The trading volumes from time  1 = t  to  time  u t t =   can be obtained directly from the proof 
of Proposition 2. From time  1 + = u t t  to  time  1 − =T t , because the price remains constant, the   18
arbitrager will not trade while the new behavior-driven investors will buy  2 q   shares each period 
of time. On the other hand, our proof above shows that the old behavior-driven investors will 
totally sell  j h q − 2   shares at time  j t t u + =  ( 1 ≥ j ). As a result, the manipulator has to sell  j h  
shares to clear the market at time  j t t u + =  and the total trading volume at time  j t t u + =  is 
2 q .■ 
Figure 2 presents the price dynamics, total trading volume and the buying/selling pattern of 
the manipulator based on Proposition 3. Comparing Figure 1 and 2, we can see that the price rise 
is less steep when  0 3 > q . The trading volume is also smaller by the manipulator, since in this 
case he needs to take into consideration the selling by loss-making investors. Because  j j h h < +1 , 
Proposition 3 indicates that the manipulator’s speed to liquidate his shares slows down gradually. 
This is because as time goes by, more and more behavior-driven investors have accumulated 
some shares of the speculative asset and will exert higher selling pressure on the market. 
The condition  ( )
() 3
3 1 2
3 q t
q q q
q t
h
u u ⋅
⋅ − =
⋅ ⋅
< α α
δ  imposed in the Proposition implies 
that the total number of shares N accumulated by the manipulator up to time  u t   must be limited, 
namely  ()
3
3 1 2
3 q
q q q
q
h
t N u
⋅ − = < = αδ , if the manipulator hopes to liquidate all his shares at 
the high price 
u t P . This result is quite intuitive. For liquidity reason, the manipulator is not able 
to sell too many shares without moving the price down. The restriction imposed on δ or N will 
also impose an upper bound for the profit made by the manipulator following the strategy 
described in the Proposition   
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Corollary 4: The manipulator’s profit π given in Proposition 3 is a decreasing function of the 
arbitrage parameter α. In particular, when  +∞ → α ,  0 → π .   
Corollary 4 reemphasize the role of the “limits of arbitrage” in our manipulation model. The 
intuition is straightforward. If the arbitrageurs trade very aggressively against the manipulator, it 
will be very difficult for the manipulator to move the price up. To move the price up by a given 
amount,  δ u t u = , by time  u t , the manipulator has to accumulate a large portfolio of  u N ⋅ =α  
shares of the speculative asset. This is not only a matter of the depth of the manipulator’s pocket 
as mentioned earlier. More importantly, as the behavior-driven investors only provide a limited 
net purchase of the speculative asset, it is impossible for the manipulator to liquidate all his 
shares of the speculative asset to the behavior-driven investors. Therefore, in a market where 
arbitrage is unlimited, the manipulator cannot be successful even if there are investors whose 
behaviors are biased. 
In terms of Proposition 3, the arbitrageurs are able to make a profit by shorting the asset at 
prices higher than the fundamental value  0 P  and then covering their short positions at the 
fundamental price  0 P   eventually. This means that it is not necessarily good for the arbitrageurs 
to take too aggressive actions to preventing the market price of the speculative asset from 
deviating from its fundamental value. If the arbitrage strength parameter  α   is too large to make 
manipulation possible, the arbitrageurs will lose their opportunities to make profit as well. 
 
Corollary 5: The manipulator’s profit π given in Proposition 3 is a decreasing function of  3 q.  
Provided  0 3 1 2 > ⋅ − ≡ q q q h , the profit π is also an increasing function of  2 q   but a decreasing 
function of  1 q . 
As previously mentioned, in our model, the manipulator can make a profit, to a large extent, 
due to the dispositional effect--the unwillingness of certain investors to sell losers. The smaller   20
the 3 q , the stronger is the dispositional effect. Moreover, it would be easier for the manipulator to 
make a profit if there are more behavioral investors who can provide liquidity (higher  2 q ). A 
higher  1 q  appears to be harmful for manipulator profits, since the manipulator needs to worry 
more about the selling by behavioral investors who entered the market and bought  1 q  shares  at 
time  u t  if  . 0 3 > q  Moreover, the smaller  1 q  is, the bigger the chance for the manipulator to 
make profits. Therefore, in our model, the momentum trading strategy of behavior-driven 
investors does not help the manipulator to make money.   
 
Proposition 6:  Suppose that  d t is fixed, that  () [ ]  
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0 3 1 2 > ⋅ − ≡ q q q h . If the manipulator prefers to maintain the price unchanged at 
u t P  (if 
possible) for k ( d t k < ≤ 0 ) periods and then let the price drop by an equal amount η ( 0 > η ), 
that is  η − = − −1 t t P P f o r   1,..., 1 u tt k T =++ − , one obtains: 
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(b)  The manipulator’s capital gain is 
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The trading volume remains at  1 q + αδ   shares per period from time  1 = t  to  time  u t t = . From 
time  1 + = u t t  to  time  k t t u + = , trading volume per period is  2 q   shares and the manipulator 
is able to sell () h q h
j
j
1
3 1
− − ≡  shares at time j t t u + =  (k j ≤ ≤ 1 ). From time  1 + + = k t t u  to   21
time  1 − =T t , trading volume per period is  αη + 2 q  and the manipulator is able to sell 
()αη αη + − = +
− h q h
j
j
1
3 1   shares at time j t t u + =  (k j > ). 
Proof: It follows immediately that if  0 3 1 2 > ⋅ − ≡ q q q h  and  > = αδ u t N  
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d t , the manipulator is able to sell shares to the behavior-driven investors 
and to maintain the price unchanged at 
u t P  for k  periods after  u t t = for some non-negative 
k   as long as  u d t T t k − − ≡ < 1 . Following the proof of Proposition 3, we obtain that if the price 
does not rise, the total number of shares bought by the behavior-driven investors minus shares 
sold by them from  1 + = u t t  through  1 − =T t  is equal to  ( ) [ ]
h
q
q
d t
⋅
− −
3
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. Therefore, the 
manipulator must sell totally  ( ) [ ]
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
 − − −
3
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q
h q t
d t
uαδ   shares to the arbitrageurs. By 
Assumption 3, the total number of shares bought from  1 + + = k t t u  through  1 − =T t  shall  be 
() η α k td − . The market clearing condition gives part (a) of the proposition. Part (b) of the 
Proposition can be proved with tedious calculations.  
The trading volumes from time  1 = t  to time  u t t =  and from time  1 + = u t t  to time 
k t t u + =  can be obtained directly from the proof of Proposition 3. From time  1 + + = k t t u  to 
time  1 − =T t , the new behavior-driven investors will buy  2 q   shares each period of time, while 
the old behavior-driven investors will totally sell  j h q − 2  shares at time  j t t u + =  ( k j > ). 
Moreover, because the price drops by η each period of time, the arbitrager will buy  αη  shares 
at time  j t t u + =  ( k j > ). As a result, the manipulator needs to sell  αη + j h  shares to clear 
the market at time  j t t u + =  and the total trading volume at time  j t t u + =  is  αη + 2 q  
( k j > ).■   22
Figure 3 presents the price dynamics, total trading volume and the buying/selling pattern of 
the manipulator based on Proposition 6. The proposition demonstrates a very clear pattern of 
short-term momentum and long-term reversal. Asset price rises for several consecutive periods 
and then drops down gradually and continually after reaching the peak. As a matter of fact, if the 
size of the speculative asset accumulated by the manipulator by time  u t t =   is sufficiently large, 
the price is bounded to reverse its up-trend some day as it is impossible for the manipulator to 
sell his shares by maintaining the price at the peak level or letting the price keep rising. The 
differences in trading patterns before and after time k t t u + =  indicate that if the manipulator 
wants to liquidate his shares in a quick manner, he must accept lower selling prices. This is 
consistent with our intuition on asset liquidity. 
Comparing Figure 2 and 3, we can see that the initial price rise could be steeper when the 
manipulator would let the sell price to fall after time  k t t u + = . The trading volume is also 
larger by the manipulator before and after the price peak, since in this case he needs to buy more 
shares to push the price higher while also sell more shares to liquidate his position. A simple 
computation shows that the manipulator makes more profit by letting the sell price to fall after 
time  k t t u + = . 
 
Corollary 7: Consider a special case of Proposition in which  1 = d t , that is, the manipulator 
needs to liquidate his shares accumulated from time  1 = t  to time  u t t =  quickly within one 
period time. One obtains:   
(a)  
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Corollary 8: In Corollary 7, the manipulator can make a profit if and only if   
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Corollary 9: Suppose that  u t is fixed and that  1 = d t , then the manipulator’s maximum profit is 
obtained by setting 
) 1 ( + ⋅
=
u t
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α
δ  (for  0 > h ). By doing so, the manipulator’s profit is 
α 2 1
2 h
t
t
u
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+
. 
Corollaries 8 and 9 provide us a quite intuitive result. If the manipulator has to complete a 
cycle of manipulation in a quick manner, he shall not move the price too slowly as by doing so, 
he will not be able to move the price up by a significant amount. On the other hand, he shall not 
be too greedy by moving the price too rapidly either, because by doing so, he will have to 
accumulate too large a position in the speculative asset and will not be able to liquidate the 
position at favorable prices.   
To provide more intuition about Proposition 6, we now consider another special case of the 
Proposition in which  1 = k  and  2 = d t . The following result can be obtained. 
 
Proposition 10: Suppose that  0 3 1 2 > ⋅ − ≡ q q q h . Consider a special case of Proposition 6 in 
which  1 = k  and  2 = d t .  One  obtains: 
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Proof: Part (a) follows immediately from Proposition 6. By the assumption, the manipulator 
shall sell  h shares at time  1 + u t  and remaining  h tu − ⋅ ⋅ δ α  shares at time  2 + u t . Because 
the average cost of the manipulator’s position in the speculative asset is  δ
2
1 −
−
u
t
t
P
u  per  share, 
the manipulator’s capital gain is given by: 
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With tedious calculations, one can find that 
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The first order condition with respect to δ yields  ( )
() 1
3 3
+
−
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u t
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α
δ . It is straightforward to verify 
that as  2 ≥ u t , the inequality in (11) also holds.   This completes the proof of part (b).  ■ 
Recall from Proposition 3 that  ( ) ( )
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 is the manipulator’s optimal 
choice of δ if he wants to liquidate all his shares at the high price 
u t P in two periods after  u t . 
Inequality (11) in proposition 10 indicates that taking such a conservative position in the 
speculative asset in order to liquidate it at a very high price is not necessary the best choice for 
the manipulator if he does not have to cash in within one period. Comparing Proposition 10 with 
Corollary 9, we find that what profit the manipulator makes depends on how soon he needs to 
liquidate his position. The manipulator’s patience in the process of liquidation pays off.   
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Proposition 11:  If  0 3 1 2 < ⋅ − ≡ q q q h , manipulation considered in our model will not be 
profitable. 
Proof: If  0 < h , the number of shares bought by the new behavior-driven investors will be 
smaller than that sold by the old behavior-driven investors whenever the price of the speculative 
asset stops rising. Therefore, when the manipulator liquidates his position, the behavior-driven 
investors as a whole will also sell. This prevents the manipulator from taking advantage of the 
irrationality of behavior-driven investors by liquidating his position to them at high prices.    ■ 
Proposition 11 highlights again the importance of  3 q , a measure of dispositional effect. 
Manipulation can be successful if and only if  3 q   is sufficiently small, that is, the 
behavior-driven investors’ unwillingness to take a loss is sufficiently strong. The proposition also 
indicates that even if there exist irrational investors, there is still no guarantee that a manipulation 
can be successful. This result has important implications for financial practices. For example, in 
the real world, the investors’ behavior can be affected by many unpredictable factors and can 
show dramatic fluctuations from time to time. In other words,  3 q  can be a random variable 
with a large variance. As a result, what consequence a real-world manipulation can bring is quite 
uncertain. If the manipulator miscalculates  3 q  and over-estimates investors’ unwillingness to 
take losses, he may well end up with a loss.   
We have many ways to extend our model to allow for the randomness of price changes. For 
example, the manipulator can choose a different t δ  for each time period  () 1,2,..., u tt t =  
instead of a fixed  δ . As long as  t δ  remain positive for all time periods  () 1,2,..., u tt t = , the 
results discussed in this section will be unchanged. We can also demonstrate that with 
appropriate choice of parameter values, the manipulator can make a profit even if he lets  t δ  be 
negative occasionally for some  ( ) 1,2,..., u tt t =  and produces a price process that appears 
random but with an upward trend. As these extensions are straightforward, to conserve space, we   26
will not discuss them in detail.   
 
Similarity and Difference Comparing to the DSSW Model 
While our model setup and results resemble De Long et al. (DSSW, 1990) in some ways, 
there are important differences. The DSSW model has four dates--0, 1, 2, and 3. In their model, 
rational speculators' buying triggers positive-feedback trading. When speculators receive good 
news and trade on it, they recognize that the initial price increase will stimulate buying by 
positive feedback traders tomorrow. In anticipation of these purchases, informed rational 
speculators buy more today and so drive prices up today higher than fundamental news warrants. 
They buy in day 1, sell and go short in day 2 at an even higher price, and cover in day 3.  The 
rational speculators make money in this model through three channels: a) private information; b) 
change in fundamental news; and c) positive feedback trading, where private information and 
variations in fundamental news are critical in determining speculators' trading strategy and profit. 
Moreover, in the DSSW model, short-run price movements from day 0 to day 1 can on average 
continue from day 1 to day 2 because speculators are risk averse and have more information on 
the liquidation value of the risky asset in day 2 than in day 1.
8  
In our model, the manipulator pumps the price continually for as many periods as he wants 
(provided that he has enough funds to do so) and then dumps his positions gradually by taking 
advantage of investors’ loss aversion. Our result does not rely on private information, 
time-varying news on the asset fundamental, and the risk-aversion of the manipulator. Our result 
does not even resort to positive feedback trading that plays a key role in the DSSW model. As we 
                                                        
8  More specifically, speculators in the DSSW model follow a "buy-short-cover" trading strategy, while the 
corresponding price pattern is "up-up-down". In other words, speculators in the DSSW model quickly 
accumulate large positions of the speculative asset on good news and then successfully liquidate their 
positions and even go short at the peak price. They buy again to cover their short positions when the price 
drops toward the fundamental value. The dynamics of trading and asset price in our model are much 
different. The manipulator in our model follows a so-called "pump-and-dump" strategy, which means 
buying gradually and then selling gradually. The trading volume of the manipulator is positively 
correlated with asset price changes. When the manipulator buys, the price goes up; when the manipulator 
sells, the prices (usually) go down. There is no such a positive correlation between the speculators' trading 
volume and asset return in the DSSW model.   27
emphasized earlier, the profit of the manipulator in our model is purely trade based and is mainly 
caused by the reluctance of behavioral investors to realize losses. In short, the rational 
speculators in the DSSW model jump on the bandwagon of good news while our manipulator 
starts the bandwagon moving by pushing it through manipulative trading. 
 
Extension to Bear Raid (Dump and Cover) 
It is worth noting that the model parameters may change over time according to different 
market conditions. While Assumption 1 may describe the trading of behavioral investors during a 
bull market for the asset, it is conceivable that each new behavior-driven investor could have a 
probability of  1 q or 2 q to short a share during a bear market. In this case, it is straightforward to 
show that we can construct an example of a “dump and cover” strategy by modifying 
Assumption 1. This is done by assuming that behavior-driven investors are bearish and only take 
short positions
9  and by stating how the short-sellers may cover their positions as follows: 
A continuum number of new behavior-driven investors, with measure 1, enter the market at 
the beginning of each period t. They are price-takers and each of them has a probability of  1 q  
to short a share of the speculative asset if the price of the asset at time t>0,  t P , is less than the 
asset price at time t-1,  1 − t P.  I f   1 − > t t P P , each new behavior-driven investor has a probability of 
2 q   to short a share of the speculative asset. 
The new behavior-driven investors at time t>0 who do not short the speculative asset choose 
to leave the market right away. The old generations of behavior-driven investors who entered the 
market before t>0 do not sell any more shares at time t. Behavior-driven investors like to take 
                                                        
9  For example, during a bear market, when the market goes down, the investor will short 0.8 shares ( 1 q ). 
And when the market goes up, the investor will short 0.3 shares ( 2 q ). Thus,  1 2 q q < . The intuition here 
is that behavioral investors are bearish and follow a negative momentum. They will take short positions 
no matter what and short more shares when the market is down. They will only buy to cover their 
position. This is similar to our original set up, where behavioral investors are bullish. They will take long 
positions no matter what. They buy more when the market is up. They will only sell to liquidate their 
position.   28
quick profits. They cover their short positions as soon as they have made a profit and then leave 
the market. Consider a behavior-driven investor who shorts a share of the speculative asset at 
time t and has not covered his share by the beginning of time  ) 0 ( > + k k t . If  k t t P P + > , he shall 
cover his short in the period of  k t +  for  sure;  if  k t t P P + ≤ , he will have a probability of  1 3 < q 
to cover his short in the period of  k t + . Behavior-driven investors leave the market right after 
they have covered their shorts. 
To conserve space, we will not provide parallel proofs of Propositions 1-10.
10 The  intuitions 
are quite similar. What make this bear raid
11  possible are the investors’ behavioral biases and the 
limit of arbitrage. Just as before, the manipulator can profit from his strategic trading by establish 
a large short position of the speculative asset while pushing asset price down, and then cover his 
position at low prices to take profits. The dispositional effect plays a critical role in making 
profitable manipulation possible. Because of this effect, the speed of price rise when the 
manipulator buys will be slower than that of price decline when the manipulator shorts. For 
simplicity, we will only discuss the case of “pump-and-dump” for the rest of the paper. 
The introduction of this paper has briefly discussed the behavior finance literature. The 
behavioral or psychological biases discussed here are shown to generate both the incentives and 
the ability of the smart money to manipulate asset prices through strategic buying and selling. 
Our result suggests that as long as there are a significant number of irrational traders, market 
                                                        
10  For example, one can easily show Proposition 2 holds by setting:  0
2 <
⋅
⋅
=
α
δ
u
d
t
q t . Because  0 3 = q , 
behavior-driven investors will not cover their shorts without a profit.    The manipulator is able to buy  2 q  
shares from the new behavior-driven investors each period from day  1 + = u t t  through  time  1 − = T t  
by maintaining the equilibrium price at  δ u t t P P
u + = 0 . The average selling price is 
u t P  per  share.  The 
manipulator’s total profit is 
2
2
1
δ α π ⋅ 




 −
⋅ = u
u t
t
  Note here that  u t   actually stands for the time period 
the asset price is being pushed downwards. 
11  Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2003) provide another example of bear raid, the so-called predatory 
trading. When a distressed large trader is forced to unwind his position and needs liquidity, other strategic 
traders may withdraw liquidity instead of providing it. This predatory trading activity makes liquidation 
costly and leads to price overshooting. The predators can make profits by covering their shorts at low 
prices.    29
manipulation may occur. 
 
4.  Other Implications of the Model 
Our model not only provides a new and distinctive example of manipulation, but also sheds 
light on the cross-section of asset returns as well as some well-known asset pricing anomalies 
such as excess volatility, short-term momentum, and long-term reversal. 
Shiller (1981, 1989) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) suggest that the historical volatility of 
stock prices in the United States are simply too high to be justified by the fundamental variations. 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) argue that the high volatility of the stock market can possibly be 
caused by changing risk aversion of the investors. They propose a habit formation framework in 
which changes in consumption relative to habit lead to changes in risk aversion and hence the 
volatility of asset returns. In out model, the fundamental value of the speculative asset does not 
change at all. As the large trader move the price with his strategic trading, the price goes up and 
down from time to time for no fundamental reason. 
Short-term momentum and long-term reversal are the other two popular empirical 
phenomena, as introduced in the previous sections.   
BSV build a model that incorporates two updating biases, conservatism (the tendency to 
underweight new information relative to priors) and representativeness (the law of small 
numbers) to explain these phenomena. When a company announces surprisingly good earnings, 
conservatism means that investors react insufficiently and therefore prices will drift up 
subsequently. After a series of good news, though, representativeness causes people to overreact 
and pushes the price up too high.   
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) stress biases (overconfidence) in the 
interpretation of private, rather than public information. If the private information is positive, 
overconfidence means that investors will push prices up too high relative to fundamentals. Future 
public information will gradually pull prices back to their true value, leading to long-term 
reversals. To get momentum, DHS assume that public information alters the investors’   30
confidence in an asymmetric fashion, a phenomenon known as self-attribution bias. Public news 
that confirms the investors’ private information strongly increases their confidence in the private 
information. Disconfirming public news, though, is largely ignored, and the investors’ 
confidence in the private information remains unchanged. This asymmetric reaction means that 
initial overconfidence is on average followed by even greater overconfidence, generating 
momentum. 
Hong and Stein (1999) assume that private information diffuses slowly through the 
population of news watchers, since news watchers are unable to extract each others’ information 
from prices, the slow diffusion means that the private information is not fully priced in an 
immediate way, generating momentum. On the other hand, momentum traders buy into price 
trend, which preserves momentum, but also generate price reversals. Since momentum traders do 
not know the extent of news diffusion, they keep buying into price trend even after the price has 
reached fundamental value, generating an overreaction that is reversed in the long run. 
In our model, there exist both price momentum and reversal because the manipulator keeps 
buying the speculative asset initially, pushing the price up period by period; he then keeps selling 
to make profits, pushing the price down.  The presence of momentum traders and the limits of 
arbitrage allows the manipulator to establish a price momentum while the existence of loss 
aversion and weak arbitrageurs gives the manipulator a chance to sell at a profit even when the 
price is coming down. 
Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) document that there is a significant cross-sectional difference 
in momentum across different stocks. Small cap stocks usually show strong momentum, but 
large cap stocks do not
12. The result of this paper is consistent with their finding. In this paper, as 
in Jarrow (1992), a large trader can be a manipulator because he has the power to affect 
(manipulate) the price. Obviously, it is much easier for someone to manipulate a small cap stock 
than to manipulate a large cap stock. Therefore, the price momentum and reversal generated by 
manipulation shall be more prominent for small cap stocks. One may also argue that higher 
                                                        
12  Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2003) argue that this phenomenon is actually a price effect related to 
trading costs.     31
transaction cost for small stocks would limit arbitrage, leading to easier price manipulation. 
However, higher transaction cost would also deter momentum trading. Thus, the net effect of 
transaction cost on price manipulation is somewhat ambiguous. 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) use a model of investor overconfidence that produces 
correlations among prices, turnover, and volatility. Their basic insight is that when investors have 
heterogeneous beliefs about the value of a stock and short sales are costly, the ownership of a 
share of the stock provides an opportunity (option) to profit from other investors' over-valuation. 
They show that the resale option leads to high speculative trading volume and contributes a 
speculative component to stock prices. In addition, fluctuations on the option value add to stock 
price volatility.   
In our model, the manipulative trading by the large investor lures momentum traders into the 
market, pushes the stock price up and generates price volatility. Thus, our model implies that 
volume is higher in an up market (when asset price rises) than in a down market. Our model also 
suggests that volume is positively correlated with volatility (a high δ means a high volatility). 
The difference between our model and that of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) is that their model 
needs some news about asset fundamentals while ours is purely based on market manipulation. 
This feature helps us understand why asset prices sometimes fluctuate continually without 
seemingly to have any news on earnings or other fundamentals. It is important to note that, 
without observing the manipulator’s trades, it will be quite hard to distinguish manipulative 
trading from speculative trading by using data only on price and trading volume. The only clue 
that might help investors detect the presence of manipulation is excessive trading volume and 
price momentum. 
 
5.  Empirical Support of Our Model 
As an empirical test of our model, we have hand-collected data on “pump-and-dump” cases 
pursued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from January 1980 to December 2002.   
In this section, we will demonstrate that the price and trading patterns from the SEC   32
manipulation cases are consistent with our model. 
 
5.1 Data Descriptions 
We collect data on “pump-and-dump” cases pursued by the SEC from the sample period. 
Specifically, we collect all SEC litigation releases that contain the key word “manipulation” or 
“9(a)” or “10(b)” which refer to the two articles of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and 
“pump-and-dump”
13. We then manually construct a database of all these manipulation cases. 
Additional information about the cases is collected from other legal databases such as 
Lexis-Nexis and the Securities and Exchange Commission Annual Reports. Furthermore we did 
“google” search of newspapers and other media reports on cases to pin down more precisely the 
beginning and end dates of the “pump-and-dump” schemes. There are 159 cases in total. Table 1 
reports data on the distribution of cases by year and by the markets in which the manipulated 
stocks were traded. There was a noted increase in manipulation cases in the period from 1995 
and 2000, either due to an increase in manipulation activities or intensified enforcement action 
by the SEC.  
  For manipulated stocks, we collect daily stock prices, trading volume, and shares 
outstanding from January 1980 to December 2002 from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago, and when not available, the online data service 
Factset. Our sample period has eleven years of additional data than Aggarwal and Wu (2003) but 
the focus of our paper is “pump-and-dump” only. We are able to collect some data for 71 stocks, 
and our empirical tests are designed to use as much of the data as possible. 
  Table 2 shows that we are able to collect data from CRSP for 23 stocks, and the information 
on the remaining 48 stocks were collected from Factset. It also reports summary statistics for the 
manipulated stocks. Most stocks were traded on the OTC Bulletin Board or the Pink Sheets. 
However, there are 24 stocks traded on major exchanges such as NYSE, AMEX and the Nasdaq. 
                                                        
13  Discussions with SEC staff indicate that the SEC is limited by its resources to bring civil actions to only a small number of 
manipulation cases per year. In addition to its own investigation activities, the SEC receives case leads from the NASD, the 
exchanges and complaints from the investing public.   33
Finally, we report in Table 2 statistics on the length of the manipulation period. The median 
length of manipulation is 123 days. The maximum is 488 days and the minimum is 3 days. 
 
5.2 Empirical Results for SEC “Pump-and-dump” Cases 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of returns, turnover, and volatility over four “periods.” 
The beginning and end dates of manipulation and other case information are collected from U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission litigation releases. Since we do not know when “pump” 
ends and “dump” starts, we define the “pump period (1/2)” as the first half of the manipulation 
period and “dump period (1/2)” as the second half of the manipulation period. For comparison, 
we define the “pre-manipulation period” as the six-month period before the beginning date of the 
manipulation and “post-manipulation period” as the six-month period after the end date of the 
manipulation. For some analyses we also define “pump period (max)” as the period from the 
beginning date of manipulation to the date with the maximum cumulative return of the 
manipulation period, and “dump period (max)” as the period from the day after the date with the 
maximum cumulative return of the manipulation period to the end date of the manipulation.   
We can see from Table 3 that the cumulative returns over the pre-manipulation period are on 
average slightly positive. Whereas the pump period (max) is noted for its large positive return of 
97.6%, the dump period (max) is equally dramatic with its large negative return of 93.9%. Both 
are statistically significant. Finally the post-manipulation period performance is a whopping 
56.2% decline. Since the lengths of manipulation periods are not the same, we also computed 
daily returns for each of the four periods. The overall pattern does not change. However, now the 
“pump-and-dump” periods are the most dramatic in the size of positive and negative returns. 
These results are consistent with the price patterns of the “pump-and-dump” strategy depicted in 
Figure 1-3.   
The table also presents summary information about daily relative turnover, which is the ratio 
of daily turnover and the average turnover over the four periods. The turnover is highest for the 
“pump-and-dump” periods, and the lowest for the pre-manipulation period. The differences are   34
statistically significant. This is consistent with increased trading activities during the 
manipulation described in our theoretical model. Finally we measure volatility using the sample 
standard deviation of daily returns over each of the four periods. Volatility on average is the 
highest during the pump period and significantly different from other three periods. Again, this is 
consistent with increased volatility during the “pumping” period described in our theoretical 
model.  
  A main testable implication of our model from section 3 is the positive correlation among 
price appreciation, volatility, and trading volume during the “pumping” period. The correlation 
results given in Table 4 are consistent with the model. To further our study, Table 5 presents 
pooled contemporaneous regression results of daily returns against turnover and an interaction 
term between turnover and an indicator variable that equals one when the firm size is below the 
median (small), 
,, , { } , it i it it s m a l l it r turnover turnover I α βγ ε =+ × + × × + . 
The explanatory variable “daily relative turnover” is the ratio of daily turnover and the average 
turnover over the four periods. Our theory predicts a positive β and a positive γ  for the 
“pumping” period, because manipulation should be more likely among small stocks. We control 
for firm heterogeneity by allowing for fixed effects but assuming the coefficients are the same 
for all firms. Our results indicate the two coefficients are indeed significantly positive during the 
“pumping” period. Moreover, we find the γ coefficient during the “pumping” period is 
significantly higher than those of other sample periods.
14 The results of Table 5 are confirmed 
visually in Figure 4 where we plot cumulative returns and turnover of manipulated stocks. We 
can see small stocks demonstrate a more rapid rise in stock prices, followed by a sharper fall and 
higher turnover during most of the manipulation period.   
 
 
                                                        
14  We did not perform a similar regression for volatility because the computation of volatility makes it impossible for us to run a 
pooled regression thus controlling for firm heterogeneity.       35
6.  Conclusions 
It is now widely believed that investors are not fully rational. If so, what can the smart money 
do? This paper provides an example in which smart money can strategically take advantage of 
investors’ behavioral biases and manipulate the price process to make profit.  It builds a model 
in which there are three types of traders, behavior-driven investors who have the tendency to sell 
winners rather than losers, arbitrageurs, and a manipulator who can influence asset prices. It 
shows that due to the investors’ behavioral biases and the limit of arbitrage, the manipulator can 
profit from his strategic trading by accumulating the speculative asset while pushing the price up, 
and then selling the asset to take profits.    The dispositional effect plays a critical role in making 
the profitable manipulation possible. Because of this effect, the speed of price decline when the 
manipulator sells will be slower than that of price rise when the manipulator buys. 
As an empirical test of our model, we hand collect data on “pump-and-dump” cases 
prosecuted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from January 1980 to December 
2002.    We find the “pump-and-dump” operations have led to higher return, increased volatility, 
larger trading volume, short-term price continuation and also long-term price reversal during the 
manipulation period. Moreover, small stocks are found to be more subject to the effects of 
manipulation. Therefore, the results from the SEC manipulation cases are consistent with our 
model. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that smart money’s speculation tends to make the market 
efficient by offsetting the foolishness of some investors. This paper provides a new 
counterexample. Smart money may actually create “market inefficiency”, by driving asset prices 
away from their fundamental value, rather than forcing asset prices to converge to their 
fundamental values. This possibility poses a new challenge for regulators. As the manipulator 
relies on neither inside information nor visible actions (other than trading), his manipulation is 
difficult to be detected and ruled out.   
Our investigation is preliminary in nature and many directions for future research remain 
open. For example, one can consider a more complicated and more realistic case in which the   36
large trader can have both privileged information and market moving power. With this setup, 
manipulation is possible and more realistic because irrational investors cannot rationally figure 
out whether the large trader’s trading is based on his private information or simply based on his 
manipulation scheme. One can also consider an extension of the current model in which the 
manipulator’s trading strategy is endogenously determined based on profit optimization. This 
extension is interesting because we can learn more about the price dynamics.       37
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Table 1: Distribution of “pump-and-dump” Cases 
 
This table lists the distribution of “pump-and-dump” cases over equity markets and their starting year 
from 1980 to 2002. The case information is collected from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
litigation releases. 
 
 NYSE  AMEX  NASDAQ OTCBB  Pinksheets Unknown Subtotal 
1980     1      1 
1981   1        1 
1982           
1983           
1984           
1985     2  2  4   8 
1986     1   4   5 
1987     1      1 
1988       2    2 
1989      1 2    3 
1990       4    4 
1991   1  1      2 
1992       1    1 
1993  1       2   3 
1994     4    3  1  8 
1995  1  4  5  4  1  15 
1996     1  5  7  1  14 
1997  1  1  4  6  1  13 
1998     1  5  11    17 
1999     6  15  9  1  31 
2000     1  8  7    16 
2001      1 7 2  10 
2002      2 1 1  4 
Subtotal  3  2  24 48  74  8 159 
 
 
   42
Table 2: Information on Cases with Market Data 
 
This table provides information on the 71 “pump-and-dump” cases for which we are able to find market 
data such as price, volume and shares outstanding. The case information is collected from U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission litigation releases. 
 
Source of data on price, volume, and shares outstanding:     
CRSP    23 stocks      
Factset    48 stocks       
total     71 stocks          
         
Exchange:          
NYSE AMEX  NASDAQ OTCBB PINKSHEET  Subtotal
2 1  21 25 22  71
         
Manipulation period length in days       
mean min  p25 p50 p75  max
167.49 3  91 123 244 488
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Returns, Turnover and Volatility 
 
The table reports summary statistics of returns, turnover, and volatility. The periods are defined as follows,   
“pre-manipulation period” is the six-month period before the beginning date of the manipulation; “pump 
period (1/2)” is the first half of the manipulation period; “pump period (max)” is the period from the 
beginning date of manipulation to the date with the maximum cumulative return of the manipulation 
period; “dump period (1/2)” is the second half of the manipulation period; “dump period (max)” is the 
period from the day after the date with the maximum cumulative return of the manipulation period to the 
end date of the manipulation; and “post-manipulation period” is the six-month period after the end date of 
the manipulation. Price, volume and shares outstanding data are collected from Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago, and Factset. “daily relative turnover” is the ratio of 
daily turnover and the average turnover over the four periods. “daily volatility” is the sample standard 
deviation of daily returns. The beginning and end dates of manipulation and other case information are 
collected from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission litigation releases, and the sample period is 
from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 2002. 
 
   mean sd N p25 p50  p75
cumulative return:         
pre-manipulation period  0.032 0.167 65 -0.534 0.014  0.654
pump period (max)  0.976 0.139 71 0.253 0.606  1.322
dump period (max)  -0.939 0.109 69 -1.386 -0.658  -0.288
post-manipulatioin period  -0.562 0.133 69 -1.404 -0.203  0.105
daily return:         
pre-manipulation period  0.005 0.003 65 -0.005 0.000  0.007
pump period (1/2)  0.018 0.009 69 -0.001 0.003  0.015
dump period (1/2)  -0.008 0.005 70 -0.009 -0.006  0.002
post-manipulatioin period  -0.003 0.002 69 -0.011 -0.002  0.001
daily relative turnover:         
pre-manipulation period  0.745 0.083 38 0.321 0.736  1.097
pump period (1/2)  2.117 0.605 42 0.672 1.016  1.741
dump period (1/2)  1.431 0.177 44 0.697 1.131  1.801
post-manipulatioin period  1.124 0.236 45 0.613 0.878  1.030
daily volatility:         
pre-manipulation period  0.139 0.015 65 0.057 0.107  0.201
pump period (1/2)  0.148 0.019 68 0.055 0.119  0.189
dump period (1/2)  0.134 0.012 69 0.063 0.104  0.173
post-manipulatioin period  0.106 0.011 69 0.055 0.090  0.139
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Table 4: Correlations between Returns, Volatility and Turnover 
 
The table reports correlation coefficients between cumulative returns, daily mean returns, relative 
turnover, and volatility for each of the four periods. The periods are defined as follows,   
“pre-manipulation period” is the six-month period before the beginning date of the manipulation; “pump 
period (1/2)” is the first half of the manipulation period; “dump period (1/2)” is the second half of the 
manipulation period; and “post-manipulation period” is the six-month period after the end date of the 
manipulation.  Price, volume and shares outstanding data are collected from Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago, and Factset. “relative turnover” is the ratio of daily 
turnover and the average turnover over the four periods. “volatility” is the sample standard deviation of 
daily returns. The beginning and end dates of manipulation and other case information are collected from 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission litigation releases, and the sample period is from January 1, 
1980 to December 31, 2002. 
 
Pre-Manipulation: Mean  Return Volatility Relative  Turnover
Mean Return  1   
Volatility 0.653 1 
Relative Turnover  -0.091 -0.215 1
Pump Period (1/2):       
Mean Return  1   
Volatility 0.837 1 
Relative Turnover  0.085 0.134 1
Dump Period (1/2):       
Mean Return  1   
Volatility -0.382 1 
Relative Turnover  0.197 -0.006 1
Post-Manipulatioin:      
Mean Return  1   
Volatility 0.488 1 
Relative Turnover  0.103 -0.083 1  45
Table 5: Pooled Regression of Daily Returns on Turnovers 
 
The table reports results for regressions of daily returns on the daily relative turnover,   
  ,, , { } , it i it it s m a l l it r turnover turnover I α βγ ε =+ × + × × +. 
The explanatory variable “daily relative turnover” is the ratio of daily turnover and the average turnover 
over the four periods. The periods are defined as follows,  “pre-manipulation period” is the six-month 
period before the beginning date of the manipulation; “pump period (1/2)” is the first half of the 
manipulation period; “dump period (1/2)” is the second half of the manipulation period; and 
“post-manipulation period” is the six-month period after the end date of the manipulation. Price, volume 
and shares outstanding data are collected from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the 
University of Chicago, and Factset. The beginning and end dates of manipulation and other case 
information are collected from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission litigation releases, and the 
sample period is from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 2002. 
 
 
      coefficient std error   t-statistic # of obs.  R-squared
           
pre-manipulation 
β  
0.014 0.003 4.610 3266 0.076
  γ   0.013 0.003 4.330  
pump period (1/2) 
β  
0.023 0.008 2.910 2093 0.031
  γ   0.043 0.009 4.620  
dump period (1/2) 
β  
0.012 0.002 5.020 2272 0.009
  γ   -0.003 0.003 -0.840  
post-manipulatioin 
β  
0.017 0.001 18.370 4519 0.094
   γ   -0.008 0.001 -6.010     
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Figure 1: Price Dynamics and Trading Volume when  0 3 = q  
(Assuming  0 , 4 . 0 , 8 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 3 , 6 3 2 1 = = = = = = q q q t t d u α ) 
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Figure 2: Price Dynamics and Trading Volume when  3 . 0 3 = q  
 (Assuming  3 . 0 , 4 . 0 , 8 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 3 , 6 3 2 1 = = = = = = q q q t t d u α ) 
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Figure 3: Price Dynamics and Trading Volume when  d t k <  
(Assuming 35 . 0 , 1 , 3 . 0 , 4 . 0 , 8 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 3 , 6 3 2 1 = = = = = = = = δ α k q q q t t d u ) 
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Figure 4: Cumulative Returns and Turnover of Manipulated Stocks 
 
The figure plots average cumulative returns and turnovers of stocks on the manipulation period. The time 
denotes progress from beginning date (time 0) to date with maximum cumulative return (time 5), and to 
end date (time 10). “turnover” is the ratio of daily turnover and the average turnover over the 
manipulation period and six months before and after the manipulation period. There are 71 stocks in the 
sample, and “small stocks” are the stocks with average market capitalization below the median of that for 
all stocks. Return data are collected from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University 
of Chicago, and Factset. The beginning and end dates of manipulation and other case information are 
collected from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission litigation releases, and the sample period is 
from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 2002. 
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